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PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL
ASSOCIATION: THE FIFTH ANNUAL MEET-
ING, EMERSON HALL, HARVARD UNI-
VERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,
DECEMBER 27-29, 1905.

THE fifth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held at Cambridge in the new Emerson Hall of Harvard University. In addition to the regular meetings of the Association, a joint session with the American Psychological Association was held on Wednesday afternoon, December 27, at which time Emerson Hall was formally opened by addresses from President Eliot and Dr. Edward W. Emerson. A discussion followed on the affiliation of psychology with philosophy and the natural sciences, in which Professor Münsterberg, President Hall, Professor Angell, Professor Taylor, and Professor Thilly took part. The President's address of the American Psychological Association on Wednesday evening was also attended by the members of the Philosophical Association. After this address a reception was given to the two Associations by Professor and Mrs. Münsterberg. After the morning session of Thursday the Association adjourned to hear Professor Ostwald's paper before the Psychological Association on "Psychical Energy." On Thursday evening the Psychological Association united with the Philosophical to hear the President's address by Professor John Dewey of Columbia, subject, "Beliefs and Realities." A smoker followed at the Harvard Union.

The business meeting of the Association was held on Thursday afternoon at two o'clock, President Dewey presiding. The following officers of the Association were elected for the year 1906: *President*, Professor William James; *Vice-President*, Professor Ernest Albee; *Secretary and Treasurer*, Professor John Grier Hibben; the two new members of the executive committee to serve for two years, Professor A. K. Rogers and Professor Frank Thilly.

The appreciation of the kindly hospitality of Harvard University and the generous provision made for the comfort of the members of the Association was expressed in a hearty and unanimous vote.

The treasurer's report was submitted and approved, and is as follows :

The balance on hand as reported by Professor Gardiner, December 31, 1904, was \$101.43. Professor Gardiner also received from dues of members \$21.00, making a total of \$122.43. Of this amount, he spent \$30.90 to defray expenses of the Philadelphia "Smoker," leaving balance of \$91.53.

JOHN GRIER HIBBEN, SECRETARY AND TREASURER, IN ACCOUNT
WITH THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION.

Receipts.

Received from Professor Gardiner, the former Secretary and Treasurer.....	\$ 91.53
Received from dues in addition to amount paid to Professor Gardiner.....	88.20
Total.....	<u>\$179.73</u>

Expenses.

New Era Printing Company.....	\$17.92
Stamps and Envelopes.....	11.00
Clerical Aid and Expressage.....	5.20
Travelling Expenses.....	3.00
	<u>\$ 37.12</u>
By balance.....	142.61
Total.....	<u>\$179.73</u>

The following were elected to membership in the Association :
Dr. Hartley Burr Alexander, Professor Charles M. Bakewell,
Dr. Halbert Hains Britan, Dr. H. C. Brown, Dr. Wendell T.
Bush, Professor W. P. Coddington, Mr. B. A. G. W. Fuller,
Miss Kate Gordon, Professor Willard Clark Gore, Professor L.
F. Hite, Dr. W. E. Hocking, Dr. Edmund H. Hollands, Pro-
fessor Williston S. Hough, Professor Eugene W. Lyman, Dr. M.
Phillips Mason, Mr. Walter B. Pitkin, Professor George L. Ray-
mond, Miss Eliza Ritchie, Miss Eleanor Harris Rowland, Mr.

George H. Sabine, Mr. David F. Swenson, Miss Anna Boynton Thompson, Dr. Luther A. Weigle.

The following are abstracts of the papers read at the sessions of the Philosophical Association, also abstracts of the discussion at the joint meeting of the Psychological and Philosophical Associations :

Beliefs and Realities. JOHN DEWEY.

[The President's Address, which appears in full in this number (March, 1906) of the *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*.]

Swedenborg's Influence upon Goethe. FRANK SEWALL.

The paper presented a brief sketch of the wide range of Swedenborg's achievements in science and philosophy as enabling him to furnish to Goethe the comprehensive survey of the world as a whole, including both its spiritual and its physical realms, which the poet demanded. Besides the references to the eloquent tributes of Emerson and of Henry James, Sr., an account is given of the close relation of Kant to Swedenborg, especially in their simultaneous publication of their doctrines of the "Two Worlds" — Swedenborg in 1769 in his treatise *De commercio animæ et corporis*, and Kant in 1770 in his Inaugural Dissertation on the *Mundus sensibilis* and the *Mundus intelligibilis*. The paper traces Goethe's acquaintance with Swedenborg through Kant, Herder, and Schiller, but especially through Fraülein von Klettenberg, a devoted student of the Swedish seer who in Frankfort in the early '70's at the beginning of the Faust conception introduced Goethe to the *Arcana* of Swedenborg and its other-world revelations. Quotations are also given from the Doctoral Dissertation of Hans Schlieper before the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Berlin in 1901 on Emmanuel Swedenborg's *System der Naturphilosophie besonders in seiner Beziehung zu Goethe-Herderschen Anschauungen*, showing the parallel drawn between Goethe's *Deutsche Parnass* and the profound and little known work of Swedenborg, *De cultu et amore dei*, in which is described man as the microcosm reflecting in his mental and moral development all the forces and activities of the universe for good and for evil. Mention is made of the careful study by Johann Niejahr in his

Kritische Untersuchungen zu Goethe's Faust in *Euphorion*, Vol. IV, pp. 272-287, where the Monologue, especially, is explained in the light of Goethe's discovery of the "Book of Mystery" and of his joy and relief at being delivered from the dungeon of dead nature and blind dogma and pedantry. Also of the extensive review by Max Morris of Charlottenburg in his article *Swedenborg in Faust*, in *Euphorion*, Vol. VI, pp. 491 ff., in which striking parallelisms are drawn between Swedenborg's *Heaven and Hell* and the Second Part of the Tragedy where Faust's translation into the spirit-world is described.

The Conditions of Greatest Progress in American Philosophy.

D. S. MILLER.

The social development of philosophy has only begun. We set out with individualizing, with systems that carry the cherished originality and personal stamp of their several authors. We must pass to coöperative action. In its social development philosophy must be on one side international, but this Association and other tokens show that a national branch may flourish with a growth of its own and with its own form and fruit. Philosophy is not a science till a tested method has been achieved, such as to produce, in some principles at least, a consensus of experts. To secure conscious advance to this end, philosophy must feel her public function, her responsibility as teacher. Roused by this responsibility, the prime aim must be to reach common ground. For American thought, the chief means for this end are: (1) To use as plain English as we can, (2) to practice a searching mutual criticism in the interest of an accurate habit, (3) to study the divergent temperaments that find satisfaction in philosophies, and (4) to draw ourselves on one side closer to life by recognizing in common as the ancients did, and as many impulses of thought in America inspire us to do, that *Lebensweisheit* is an essential strain in all philosophy.

The Influence of American Political Theories on the Conception of the Absolute. I. WOODBRIDGE RILEY.

The conception of the Absolute in America assumes three forms in three successive centuries; in the seventeenth being

monistic, in the eighteenth dualistic, in the nineteenth pantheistic. Under puritanism there is a belief in one, supreme, self-sufficient Being, the sole ruler and disposer of all things; under Deism, a belief in a deity whose powers and functions are limited by a law outside himself, — the law of nature which is inviolable and immutable; under transcendentalism, the Deity, becoming immanent, is submerged in nature, can scarce be distinguished from the cosmic processes. As with Spinoza so with Emerson, the concept of God and the concept of the world-ground are identical; the Absolute is one with the ordering and creative power of the universe. Our problem is to show how these conceptions were influenced by the current theories of government: under absolute monarchy, sovereignty being conceived to be given by God to the king, who thus rules by divine right; under limited monarchy, sovereignty being shared between ruler and subject in a dual control; under representative monarchy, sovereignty being vested chiefly in the people through the inalienable right of the law of nature. The sources are found in the creeds of the state-church, colonial charters, and state constitutions, but chiefly in the speculations of men like John Wise, Jonathan Mayhew, and William Livingstone who, depending on Puffendorf, Grotius, and Montesquieu, indicate the drift from monistic determinism to the deistic severance between the law of God and the law of nature, the latter being put over against the deity as a separate legislative entity. This law, which under Puritanism was a subordinate, and under Deism a coördinate source of authority, becomes under Transcendentalism an independent and ultimate law, *lex* being now substituted for *legislator*. The identification of the guiding, rational principle and the eternal operations of nature is made as early as 1784 by Ethan Allen in his *Oracles of Reason*. Or put in political terms, the sovereignty first granted to the king, then shared by the people, is finally lodged solely in the democracy. Hence the analogy between the pantheism of Emerson and the doctrine of popular sovereignty. As the universe governs itself, is sufficient to itself, and is itself its own end, so the federal government is declared of the people, by the people, and for the people.

The Kantian Doctrine of God as Compared with that of Plato and Aristotle. W. T. HARRIS.

A paper on God as Regulative Idea and God as the Absolute, discussing the actual difference between Kant's doctrine of God as a regulative idea and the old ontological doctrine based on Plato (*Laws*, Book X) and Aristotle (*Metaphysics*, XII, 7; *De Anima*, III, 3, 4 and 5; *Physics*, III and VI). In how far does a regulative principle in Kant's meaning equal the authority of the old ontological proof? What is its real significance in theology? The old ontological argument seeks the ultimate presupposition of motion in the world and finds it in a Being that is self-active in the sense that mind is self-active, self-thinking, self-realizing, or will. The difficulty with ordinary common sense in seeing the gist of this ancient thought, which has created so much history in the world during its career, is caused by the uncertainty in the middle term, which lies between the fact or event present to our senses and the ultimate, complete cause, which is demanded by our careful, painstaking reflection. We glance from the moved object to a second object which moves it, and we seem to have an effect and its cause. But further observation convinces us that the supposed cause is itself an effect quite as much as the effect which we started with. Neither of the two originates anything; the originating cause lies beyond. We carry back our search from link to link, and find only transmitters but no originators, no true causes. It was an important result of Kant's thinking on this problem that modern philosophy came to see that a First Cause cannot be a mere end-link to a series of conditions in time and space; for an original cause such as mind or will (human or divine) belongs to noumena and not to phenomena, and therefore cannot be coördinate with phenomena in a causal series. Hence he devised the four antinomies in his *Critique of Pure Reason* to show the conflict between these two orders of being and the possibility of two contradictory proofs, one of these proofs based on ordinary experience and one based on the idea of true cause, which Kant called "a fiction of the reason invented to correct the incompleteness of the regress of causes as found in experience." Kant's argument in the third antinomy has the following steps: (1) If

everything that happens presupposes a previous condition as stated by the law of causality ; (2) this previous condition cannot be a permanent (or have been always in existence) ; for, if so, its consequence or the effect would have always existed ; (3) thus the previous condition must be a thing that has happened, and thus presupposes another condition preëxisting, and so to infinity without finding an originating cause. (4) With this, however, the law of causality collapses ; namely, since each cause proves to be a mere effect, its causal power escapes into a higher number of the series, and unless the law changes, and we reach an originating cause, wholly vanishes and their results are an indefinite or an infinite series of effects with no cause. (5) But (in the antithesis) Kant finds another contradiction. "A dynamically primal beginning of action presupposes a state which has no causal connection with the preceding state of the cause and is not in any way a result or effect of that previous state. Transcendental freedom (an originating cause) is therefore opposed to the natural law of cause and effect, and destructive of the possibility of unity in experience and therefore not to be found in experience and is consequently a mere fiction of thought." But Kant's proof of the antithesis is incomplete as he gives it, and should have been concluded somewhat in this manner : Since the law of causality by itself never reaches a true cause, it really is not a progress towards a cause, and it therefore by its progress *ad infinitum* demonstrates its essential incompleteness ; it is worse than a case of accumulation of a long series of mere effects without causes ; it confesses that it never can arrive at its true originating causality, and that its boasted law of "every event has its cause" is therefore an idle fiction and ought to be abolished on its own showing.

A Philosophical Pilgrimage: Reflections of a Visit to the Homes and Abodes of Berkeley, Hume, Locke, and Descartes. FRANCIS B. BRANDT. (Read by title.)

The Significance of Methodological Principles. ERNEST ALBEE.

Rationalism has been a far more persistent tendency in modern thought than is commonly recognized. While the Critical

Philosophy, logically developed, carries one beyond rationalism, Kant's own system is rationalistic in important respects, both on the theoretical and on the practical side, and may be described as imperfectly critical rationalism. This is plainly true of his so-called 'constitutive' principles, in so far as these are involved with his table of quasi-logical categories; but his actual use of 'regulative' principles, as applied to the problems of ethics, is open to much the same criticism. Yet 'regulative' principles, in the larger sense of the methodological principles of science and philosophy, so far from being dangerous to idealistic philosophy, are its salvation, if properly interpreted. The question is: In what relation do these methodological principles stand to reality? If reality is beyond experience, the problem is insoluble; but, in spite of differences of terminology, we seem to agree that reality is identical with experience in the largest sense. In what relation, then, do these principles stand to experience? The difficulty seems to be that science becomes progressively abstract, while experience remains concrete. As our scientific principles become accurate, they appear to depart from the reality of immediate experience. This very difficulty shows the persistence of the rationalistic tendency even in recent thought. We forget that these principles have no real significance apart from their functional relation to experience; and since, taken by themselves, they are plainly abstract and schematic, we overlook the fact that, in proportion as they are practically helpful in organizing our knowledge, and thus enabling us to deal effectively with experience, they are necessarily informing us with regard to the organic constitution of reality. Not brute experience, but organized experience, is the real, though in a sense also ideal.

Induction and the Disjunctive Syllogism. W. P. MONTAGUE.

There are two ways in which a proposition can be proved — directly, by premises that imply its truth; indirectly, by premises that imply the falsity of its contradictory alternatives. In the deductive syllogism in which we can reason from universals, the direct method is the more natural. And it is generally assumed that the same is true in induction. When we consider, however, (1) that in induction we must reason from the particular propo-

sition furnished by experience, and (2) that a particular proposition can never of itself be adequate to prove the truth of the corresponding universal, although (3) it is entirely adequate to disprove the universal proposition that contradicts it, the possibility suggests itself that induction properly belongs to the indirect type of inference. The paper is an exposition and defence of this view. In answer to the question as to how the universals of science can be derived from the particulars of experience, it is maintained that the inductive process by which a hypothesis is proved is essentially and exclusively a process of eliminating rival hypotheses, and that this eliminative process is appropriately expressed, not by a categorical, but by a disjunctive syllogism, of which the major premise is a statement of the possible causes or universal connections of a given phenomenon, while the minor premise is a statement of the particular observations and experiments that eliminate all of these alternatives but one. The following advantages are claimed for this theory of induction: (1) It explains why it is that the weakness of an induction has nothing to do with the necessarily limited number of positive instances. (2) It enables us to locate (and therefore to measure and remedy) the source of weakness in every induction, which consists in the claim to enumerate all the concomitants or possible causes of a phenomenon. (3) It enables us to view Mill's inductive canons, not as a group of disconnected principles, but rather as an organic system, no one of them sufficient in itself, but each adapted especially to eliminate a given type of alternative and capable of supplementing the defects of the others.

Connection between Logic and Mathematics. MRS. C. LADD FRANKLIN. (Abstract not given.)

Experience and Thought. J. E. CREIGHTON.

It is maintained against Pragmatism that the logical problem cannot be defined completely or adequately in terms of the particular situation. Thought always has, in addition to the specific problem with which it is occupied at any particular time, a more general and ultimate end, the realization and maintenance of a rational life. It is only by reference to this end that the particu-

lar problems and acts of thinking get their significance. Again, the antithesis between thinking and 'concrete ways of living,' assumed commonly by the pragmatists, is criticised and the conclusion urged that experience is a single process throughout its various stages of development. It is only when experience is regarded as the development of a single principle which maintains itself in and through its differentiations that one can properly speak of the parts as 'functions' or 'in functional relation' at all.

Evolution and the Absolute. H. HEATH BAWDEN.

Two principles of modern science — conservation and evolution — seem to come into fatal conflict. We face the dilemma of viewing the universe either as a closed system or as a progressive growth, each of which taken by itself appears to be an untenable view. We cannot believe that something has evolved out of nothing; this strikes at the rationality of the universe. But to regard the universe as a completed system strikes at its morality; it destroys the possibility of freedom, initiative, progress. This is the antinomy of essence or nature *versus* origin. Professor Baldwin has shown that the question of absolute origin cannot be answered because it cannot intelligently be asked. The earlier stages of a process — origin — can only be stated in the same terms as the later stages which we regard as exhibiting its nature. A thing *is* what it *does*, and no reason can be assigned for marking off any part of the career of its behavior as origin except in a relative sense. It follows that the distinction of essence *versus* origin is a functional one, having meaning only with reference to the interest or purpose in hand. The ideas of unity (conservation) and continuity (evolution) are true, therefore, only when interpreted in terms of each other. Science must assume the conservation of the system within which she is working in order to make the genetic or evolutionary statement useful, while, on the other hand, the continual evolution of new meanings is necessary to make the conservation doctrine intelligible. From this point of view, it is possible to state the elements of truth in evolutionism and absolutism. The so-called evolutionary philosophy of Spencer is inconsistently based on an abso-

lute interpretation of the principle of conservation ; that is, it is not in a true sense evolutionary. It only escapes absolutism by its self-contradictory doctrine of the Unknowable. The absolutism of Mr. Bradley and Mr. Royce, in so far as it asserts the existence of a completed timeless reality, falls into essentially the same error. How can the Absolute have change belonging to it as a genuine part of its nature and yet not itself be subject to change? Only if the term 'absolute' be given a functional interpretation. Reality or experience is absolute, in the only defensible sense of the term, in moments of relative realization of purposes or ends. It is conceived as having a starting-point and goal only when it is relatively inadequate to those purposes or ends. In other words, it is conceived as absolutely conserved or as an evolution in time according to the demands of the specific and concrete situation.

Consciousness and Evolution. FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE.

To regard consciousness as an outcome of evolutionary processes involves a radical transformation of many of the fundamental problems of modern philosophy, because these problems have been controlled by an initial conception of consciousness which is not evolutionary. This conception involves the positing of the mind as an original capacity or receptacle endowed with certain constitutional powers and needing the operation of some agency to give it the content known as the content of consciousness. The mind is thus conceived as an end-term of a relation. Hume, by denying ascertainable character to the mind so conceived, and post-Kantian idealism, by giving it a character commensurate with the richness of concrete experience, represent the extremes to which the resulting philosophy went. To this line of thought the evolutionary conception of consciousness presents a striking contrast. Here the mind is not posited as an end-term, but rather processes of various sorts undergoing continual reorganization until they become conscious, and thus lead to the recognition that as conscious processes they are not original but derived. Although the evolutionary conception has not been as clearly worked out as the other, it tends to render the general philosophical problems arising from the end-term conception of

mind largely meaningless to the evolutionist. The body-mind controversy, for instance, with its metaphysical implications, appears to be wholly removed or radically transformed by evolutionary conceptions. So long as the mind is conceived as an end-term of a relation, we may inquire about its relation to the other term; and so long as consciousness is conceived as the mind's possession, we may speculate concerning its relation to the body and its physical efficiency. On this basis, interaction and parallelism are at least formally statable problems. Evolutionary conceptions, on the contrary, doing away with the end-term notion of mind, render even a clear formal statement of such problems difficult, and lack the motive for the main material difficulties connected with them. The end-term conception of mind has given rise to a doctrine of 'ideas,' 'mental states,' 'states of consciousness,' a doctrine of a mental series of existences, numerically and qualitatively distinct from all other existences and constituting the sole objects of consciousness, which doctrine is alien to the evolutionary conception of consciousness. Here the evolutionary theory has not freed itself from the older view. Yet we are to-day witnessing radically transformed definitions of psychical processes which aim at freedom from the confusion attending a doctrine of 'mental states' on an evolutionary basis. Since evolution proposes to trace the genesis of consciousness, evolution itself cannot be understood if consciousness, in its occurrence, involves the substitution of a new order of existences. When consciousness is brought within the sphere of evolution, it bids fair to transform some of our stock notions about evolution itself. For if in consciousness we have the process of evolution itself become conscious, we have grounds for claiming to have an immediate experience of what evolution is. That process would thus appear to be, not the unfolding of a past, but the successive achievements of an effective present whose achievements have the character and value they disclose wherever they become apparent, or are realized.

The Formal Fallacy in Subjectivism. A. E. TAYLOR.

Pure subjectivism, as expressed in the writings of many physicists and biologists, and some professional philosophers, is the

view that the object which a state of mind knows is its own occurrence as a mental process. This amounts to the doctrine that the relation between percipient and percept is logically such as to have itself, and nothing but itself, as its sequent or second term. But the existence of such a type of relation seems logically impossible, since it inevitably involves an indefinite regress, and this regress is of an illegitimate kind, inasmuch as its completion would be necessary before we could even say what we mean by the second term in any perceptual relation, *i. e.*, the perceived object. To escape the illegitimate regress, we are bound to assume that there is at least one instance of the perceptual relation in which the relation (the process) and its sequent (the perceived object) are not identical. Thus the theory of knowledge must necessarily start from the standpoint of natural realism, though it does not also follow that it must end there.

Pure Science and Pragmatism. E. G. SPAULDING.

The purpose of this paper was to examine some of the examples of pragmatic procedure in the sciences, especially those pointed to by the pragmatists themselves, discover their implications, structure, etc., and compare these with the claims of 'theoretical' pragmatism. For this purpose the 'new physics' was chosen as an especially good example. In this the qualities are accepted and treated as irreducible and objective. Symbolic methods prevail, leading up to abstractions, in which, in the form of equations, it is found that relations are known which are never given in perception. Epistemology has studied this point too little. Adequate images for the meanings of these symbolic judgments cannot be formed. Among many classes of 'needs' there is one upon success in satisfying which the very existence of other needs may depend, *viz.*, the need for a reliable means of conserving and furthering life itself. The need and the knowledge satisfying it best (science) are both alogical. Upon what does success depend? Upon a regularity outside the inference-prediction itself, outside of conscious events, and in a transcendent. Examination of the various kinds of cognition shows the knowledge experience in each case to refer to an 'other,' and that this 'other' may be 'independent of' and different in

kind from the cognitive act. This is supported by the fact of two kinds of implication, one based on 'success,' the other on formal correctness; the former is called biological, the latter logical implication. The success of a production implies a transcendent regularity, to which, now, knowledge refers as its object. The transcendent is 'in' experience in the sense that that which is implied is in the implier and 'beyond' analogously. The 'successful' system implies also an object for and distinct from the content of normal perception. This object is an element in the transcendent causal manifold. From this a definition of 'correct data' is obtained. In the scientific knowledge-experience four aspects are to be distinguished: symbol, meaning or content, image, and object known. The ground for the success and validity of knowledge is external to knowledge itself. The examination of the 'pure experience' position shows that at least some of its interpretations are not consistent with the dualism involved in the scientific pragmatic procedure.

Scholasticism and Reaction. BROTHER CHRYSOSTOM.

It is a mistake to consider the static side only of scholasticism; the dynamic side is more in harmony with our age. The root principle of action, according to the Schoolmen, is act in the broadest meaning of that term, or form if we limit our investigation to the sensible world. All that an entity does is derived from its form and expresses that form. If the entity be inorganic, its reactions are manifested in various forms of motion, all of which lack spontaneity. In the case of living organisms, the various tendencies arising from either heredity or environment are all subject to an inner unifying control looking to the development of the individual or the species. But it is in the theory of cognition that the doctrine of reaction plays a conspicuous part. The living organism, being essentially though not exclusively material, is in so far passive and plastic, *i. e.*, receptive of outward influences; but when so impressed, it reacts after the manner proper to its kind, and in this very reaction performs the act of perception and becomes aware of something other than itself. The broad lines of this theory are the same for sensation and intellection, and consequently determine in great measure such reactions as out-

bursts of passion and deliberate exercise of will. Resolves, habits, virtue and vice, the scheme of education and the plan of one's life are all inseparable from reactions, which are a condition of progress in the individual and in the race.

A Criticism of Psycho-physical Parallelism as an Ontology.

H. H. HORNE.

The theory of psycho-physical parallelism serves in three fields, viz. : (1) psychology, (2) evolutionary philosophy, and (3) ontology. As an ontology it does more or less service in the systems of Spinoza, Leibniz, Fechner, Lotze, Wundt, and Paulsen. This criticism will concern itself with parallelism as an ontology, touching the other uses only incidentally. Not to slight the strength of the position of parallelism, let it be noted that it agrees with 'common sense' that both mind and matter are real ; it agrees with the usual interpretation of the doctrine of the conservation of physical energy that the soul is not a cause ; it agrees with the current biology and physiology that consciousness does not move the body ; it has logical consistency in defending pan-psychism ; it provides working theories on the origin of life and mind ; it makes the microcosm analogous to the macrocosm ; it defends a world-soul or the God of religion ; it invalidates materialism ; and it asserts mind is more valuable than matter, and is so far idealistic. Passing to our criticisms of parallelism as an ontology, it is to be noted (1) it is too vague a system to satisfy any strict ontologist. The parallelist agrees with the materialist in asserting the reality of matter, with the idealist in asserting the reality of mind, with the dualist in asserting the reality of both, and with the agnostic monist in asserting the reality of neither. The inconsistency of parallelism at this point appears in its being dominantly dualistic as an ontology while becoming pantheistic in its cosmology. (2) In its dualistic ontological form, the same objections apply to it as to any dualism or pluralism, viz., the unity of consciousness gives unity to any proposed plurality ; and relationships must exist between the supposed plural parts, thereby making reality a unity ; and also, the infinitude of reality means reality is a unity, for if reality were dual, it would be two finites, but not one infinite. (3) Parallelism

as an ontology does not explain, it only formulates. It does not explain why there should be any reality at all, nor why it should take the parallelistic rather than some other form. (4) It makes a very poor formulation of the facts of reality when it declares the physical and the psychical processes are parallel to each other, for each process has one or more characteristics which exclude a strict parallelism in the other. What in the physical process corresponds to the individuality of the psychical? And what in the psychical process corresponds to the quantity, extension, and space of the physical? And what, indeed, is parallel to the fact of parallelism itself? Having these distinctions of the psychical and physical in mind, it would seem as if parallelism takes seriously a mathematical figure of speech. (5) In its denial of the causal relation between mind and body, affirming only concomitance, parallelism is in direct violation of Mill's method of determining causal connection by concomitant variations. Causality is more than concomitance; it is in its elementary form (after Höffding) an inevitable succession, and in its ideal form an equivalence or identity. (6) No parallelist has been able as yet to show how the unity of human consciousness can have arisen out of the fusion of the psychic sides of atoms, or out of the 'mind-dust.' Indeed, science to-day has altogether discarded atoms. Our conclusion on the whole, therefore, is that parallelism is not satisfactory as an ontology, and, positively, that the satisfactory ontology, when we get it, must be a unity, must be self-consistent, and must validate the experience we already possess.

Relation of Psychology to Philosophy in Æsthetics. ETHEL D. PUFFER. (Abstract not given.)

The Quality of Psychical Dispositions. E. A. PACE.

The paper reviews the logical aspects of the theory of psychical dispositions, under the following heads: (1) The concept of dispositions, though derived from the physical order, is applied to mental life, while the substance idea, because of its origin, is rejected. (2) Although the quality of psychical dispositions is said to be unknowable, they are postulated in explanation of

certain essential features of consciousness. (3) It is remarkable that mere dispositions, to which neither the character of substantial reality nor that of actual process can be ascribed, should exert so considerable an influence on the development and activity of mind. (4) The theory of psychical dispositions is not strengthened by the assumption that these dispositions are psychophysical.

Discussion : The Affiliation of Psychology with Philosophy and the Natural Sciences. HUGO MÜNSTERBERG.

The housing of psychology in the new Emerson Hall of Philosophy at Harvard is Harvard's answer to the question of affiliation. Psychology is to go on studying its phenomena in its own way, but it refuses to be divorced from philosophy. Professor Wundt, who is certainly competent to speak on this subject, is in favor of the arrangement and against turning over psychology to the natural sciences. I have always insisted on the value of experiment, physics, and physiology in psychology, but that cannot lead me to identify psychology with the natural sciences. Indeed, I must repeat the statements made by me in the *Grundzüge der Psychologie*: The way to psychology must proceed from philosophy. "With the psychological problems themselves philosophy has nothing to do; but the question, What is psychology, what can it be, what ought it to be? is a purely philosophical question."¹

G. STANLEY HALL.

Psychology is a branch of natural science and can be fruitfully studied only in connection with the phenomena of the material world. Its business is to examine the physical and physiological conditions of mental states, and this it can do only by employing the methods of the natural scientist. As an empirical science it has nothing to do with metaphysics. We cannot deduce the facts of psychology by metaphysical speculations, and *facts* are what we are after in psychology.

¹ The abstracts of Professor Münsterberg's and President Hall's remarks are given above as reported by the Secretary of the Philosophical Association. Professor Münsterberg's will appear in full in an article entitled "Emerson Hall," in *Harvard Studies*.

JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL.

Ought psychology to continue indefinitely its allegiance to philosophy, or should it enroll its name under the banners of the natural sciences? Professor Münsterberg has warmly defended the first alternative. President Hall is no less fervent in his espousal of the second. For my own part, I refuse to recognize either the necessity or the wisdom of taking any overt measures looking toward the one step or the other. And the absence of such a necessity I regard as eminently fortunate, for psychology is just beginning to gain the respect of the scientists, and she has not as yet wholly lost that of the philosophers. She is, therefore, in too delicate a position gratuitously to alienate the sympathy and support of either of these powerful allies. As a matter of fact, apart from the question of the label by which we shall classify psychology — and this is evidently a somewhat academic issue — I do not see how any serious divergence of opinion is possible upon the point under consideration. That our Harvard friends have put their psychological laboratory in this superb building devoted also to philosophy does not raise in my mind the question as to any impropriety in this cohabitation, but rather a sense of the gratification which each party to the contract ought to feel in such admirable companionship and in such stately and appropriate quarters. Certainly I should gladly accept for myself, were it offered, a laboratory so excellently appointed even though my neighbors in the building were such psychological outcasts as lawyers or doctors. Mere physical juxtaposition means little, unless it embodies an avowal of spiritual dependence or affiliation which evidently is no necessary part of it. In this particular instance, however, there is a high degree of spiritual intimacy which must make the companionship of the contracting parties extremely profitable to both. But this is by no means to maintain or admit that this companionship is the only one congenial and advantageous to them. Every one knows that psychology has for the most part a philosophical lineage and that certain highly important foundations of psychology, even when it is regarded as a natural science, must always be of a philosophical character. Any proposition, therefore, permanently to

estrangle these two must be regarded not only as ill-advised, but also as impracticable. On the other hand, every one is equally well aware that in many of its methods and most of its ideals modern psychology is approaching the position of the sciences, and especially the biological sciences. Consequently, unless one is ready to indict the whole spirit of the contemporary movement, it seems imperative to countenance and encourage the most intelligent appreciation by psychologists of those forms of scientific procedure which they are likely to wish to appropriate. Such intelligent familiarity they can only attain through intimate association with these sciences. The general intellectual poise which philosophical training affords cannot be sacrificed by psychology without the most disastrous consequences. But at the same time psychology just as surely needs the invigorating contact of the natural sciences. Indeed, it does not seem too much to claim that psychology has a peculiar mission at this precise juncture in the bringing together of the interests of philosophy and natural science. Certainly no other science is in so strategic a position for the accomplishment of this purpose.

A. E. TAYLOR.

The affiliation of psychology appears to be with the natural rather than with the philosophical sciences. It is distinguished from the abstract philosophical sciences of formal logic and mathematics by its dependence on empirical premises ultimately based upon the testimony of direct perception and involving in their meaning a reference to a particular moment of time. In this respect, it resembles the empirical sciences of physical nature. Nor do the allegations that it deals only with 'individual objects' and non-quantitative processes afford a satisfactory basis for distinguishing it from the natural sciences. It differs, again, from both the abstract and concrete philosophical sciences (ethics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of history, etc.), in making no use of the concept of ideal norms of value.

FRANK THILLY.

The fact that mind can be studied in connection with matter does not make psychology a branch of natural science. Psychology is interested in a unique body of facts, and a perfect

knowledge of their material antecedents would not give us a knowledge of mind as such. The argument that the physiological states are the real things and brain knowledge the only scientific knowledge rests on the questionable metaphysics of materialism. Even if it were true, the psychologist would go right on studying the so-called effects of brain states, for knowledge of brain motions would not tell the whole story. But our knowledge of what is going on in the brain does not yet form a complete science. Besides, the brain physiologist cannot take a step in the construction of his hypotheses without psychology. If the psychical states could be deduced from their physiological causes, the physiologist could ignore psychology, but there would still remain a more direct way of studying mind for the psychologist. The argument is also urged that the mental series does not form a continuous line, that a closed causal nexus, and hence science, exists for external nature only, and that to be scientific, psychology must become a natural science. We answer: More careful observation may disclose the missing links, and where this fails we can have recourse to hypotheses. Besides, there are gaps in the physiological line also, which are bridged over by theory. Finally, if psychology is impossible because of breaks in the mental causal series, cerebral physiology is impossible for analogous reasons, and also because we then have no key with which to open the secrets of the brain. The view that psychology is a natural science because it employs the methods of science is also untenable. The psychologist uses the objective method, but introspection is everywhere his basis and guide. Experiment facilitates, corrects, and controls introspection. Measurement forms but a small and unimportant part of the problem. In conclusion, affiliation with philosophy is in the interests of both fields. Psychology is indispensable to the other philosophical studies, while the aims and problems peculiar to the latter help to give direction to the former. Interest in philosophical problems fixes attention on mental states which the scientist is apt to ignore because he can find no physical antecedents for the same, acts as a safeguard against a false mental atomism, and tends to keep in view the unity of mind. The relation of psychology to metaphysics is not

to be conceived as an *a priori* construction of the facts of psychology from metaphysical principles. But if dependence on metaphysics means that psychology must start out from some broad assumptions and must have recourse to hypotheses in attempting to explain, then psychology depends on metaphysics. There is no absolutely presuppositionless psychology.

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(Members are requested to notify the Secretary of any correction to be made in the above list.)